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Private companies typically have only a limited number of owners, each with a large own-
ership share. This concentrated ownership helps to overcome control problems caused by
the opaqueness of business operations. However, it also exposes owners to idiosyncratic risk,
since they often invest a high share of their personal net worth in a single company. Their
personal portfolios are therefore not well diversiﬁed. If owners require a compensation for
their risk exposure, they have to demand higher returns on their equity investment, which
is equivalent to higher costs of equity capital.
We test two hypotheses about the consequences of owners’ lack of diversiﬁcation. First,
since poor diversiﬁcation increases the cost of equity capital, we expect a higher demand
for bank ﬁnancing from owners who have invested a higher share of their personal wealth in
the company. This would be the consequence if owners tried to equalize the marginal cost
of equity and debt capital. Second, we hypothesize that a higher exposure to idiosyncratic
risk leads to higher leverage. This is the central point of interest of this paper: a higher
cost of equity capital for less diversiﬁed owners should lead to a more extensive use of bank
ﬁnancing.
These hypotheses are tested with data from a survey of private companies from the US.
As hypothesized, we ﬁnd that less diversiﬁed owners confronted with higher costs of equity
capital evince a higher demand for bank loans. The probability that a company made
an application for a new loan in the three years preceding the survey increases with lack of
diversiﬁcation. Furthermore, being less diversiﬁed has a positive and large eﬀect on leverage.
Owners’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk is therefore an important determinant of the capital
structure of private companies.How Does Owners’ Exposure to Idiosyncratic Risk
Inﬂuence the Capital Structure of Private Companies?
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Abstract
This paper identiﬁes the owner’s exposure to idiosyncratic risk as an important deter-
minant of the demand for loans and the capital structure of private companies. The
analysis is based on a sample of small and medium-sized companies from the United
States. The exposure to idiosyncratic risk is approximated by the share of personal net
worth invested in one company (SNWI). Exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the
cost of equity capital, since higher equity returns are required as compensation. This
therefore makes bank ﬁnancing more attractive. We ﬁnd that SNWI increases both
the demand for new bank loans and leverage substantially.
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Private companies typically have only a limited number of owners, each with a large own-
ership share. This concentrated ownership helps to overcome control problems caused by
the opaqueness of business operations. However, it also exposes owners to idiosyncratic
risk, since they often invest a high share of their personal net worth in a single company
(Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)). Their personal portfolios are therefore not well
diversiﬁed. If owners require a compensation for their risk exposure, they have to demand
higher returns on their equity investment, which is equivalent to higher costs of equity capi-
tal. External ﬁnance from banks is therefore more attractive for owners with a concentrated
investment.
The main point of this paper is to investigate how owners’ exposure to idiosyncratic
risk inﬂuences demand for new bank loans and capital structure. Tests concerning capital
structure have so far neglected inﬂuences that stem from the speciﬁc ownership structure
of private companies. We test two hypotheses about the consequences of owners’ lack of
diversiﬁcation. First, since poor diversiﬁcation increases the cost of equity capital, we expect
a higher demand for bank ﬁnancing from owners who have invested a higher share of their
personal wealth in the company. This would be the consequence if owners tried to equalize
the marginal cost of equity and debt capital. Second, we hypothesize that a higher exposure
to idiosyncratic risk leads to higher leverage. This is the central point of interest of this paper:
a higher cost of equity capital for less diversiﬁed owners should lead to a more extensive use
of bank ﬁnancing.
The empirical analysis is based on the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) from
the year 1998. The survey is well suited for our analysis, since it provides information on
1the ﬁnancial structure of private companies and the personal wealth of their owners. The
survey includes companies with up to 500 employees, i.e. companies for which concentrated
ownership is typical. The exposure to idiosyncratic risk can be empirically approximated by
the share of the owner’s net worth which is invested in one company. Since we are confronted
with reverse causality, we use an instrumental variables approach with age of the owner and
sex of the owner as instruments for the share of net worth invested.
Our hypotheses are conﬁrmed by the data. Less diversiﬁed owners confronted with higher
costs of equity capital evince a higher demand for bank loans. The probability that a
company made an application for a new loan in the three years preceding the survey increases
with lack of diversiﬁcation. Furthermore, being less diversiﬁed has a positive and large eﬀect
on leverage. A one standard deviation increase in the share of net worth invested leads,
ceteris paribus, to an increase in leverage of 16.2 percentage points. This is substantial,
especially when considering that average leverage in the sample is 33.3%. Owners’ exposure
to idiosyncratic risk is therefore an important determinant of the capital structure of private
companies.
The empirical results improve our understanding of the ﬁnancing of private companies.
We ﬁnd that owners who are more exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their companies use
bank ﬁnancing more extensively. It allows them to reduce their own investment if they
keep company size constant or, alternatively, to grow their companies without increasing
their risk exposure further. Since exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the cost of equity
capital and accordingly the required returns of an investment project, the availability of
bank loans enables the proﬁtable realization of some investment projects that would not
have been realized otherwise. Bank ﬁnancing decreases the returns that are required for the
realization of an investment project.
2This paper is related to the literature investigating loan demand and capital structure of
private companies. Several studies investigate speciﬁc aspects of loan demand. For example,
Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) look at the inﬂuence of gender, race and ethnicity, and Berkowitz
and White (2004) consider the eﬀect of bankruptcy law. The most prominent explanations
for the capital structure of companies are the trade-oﬀ theory and the pecking order theory,
which have been mainly tested for listed companies (see, for example, Titman and Wessels
(1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and de Jong (2002)). There are also studies for private
companies, but inﬂuences from their concentrated ownership structure have so far not be
taken into consideration. Chittenden et al. (1996) investigate the importance of company
characteristics such as size, age and the ability to provide company assets as collateral.
Berger and Udell (1998) study how the capital structure changes in the ﬁnancial growth
cycle. Giannetti (2003) focuses on diﬀerences among countries, aiming to identify the impact
of legal rules and ﬁnancial development.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
background and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 explains the data set and deﬁnes the
variables; Section 4 shows the empirical results; and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section we state advantages of concentrated ownership derived from theory, explain
that the exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the cost of equity capital, and argue that,
for most companies, this will make bank loans but not new equity more attractive.
Two theoretical models can be employed to derive the advantages of concentrated own-
ership. A high ownership share is used as a signal for company quality in the model by
3Leland and Pyle (1977). Keeping a large ownership share allows high quality entrepreneurs
to achieve a high valuation for the equity sold. It is not proﬁtable for owners of low quality
companies to mimic this behaviour, since they will then receive a larger share of the expected
low proﬁts. Whereas the true value of the ﬁrm is exogenous in the signalling model, agency
theory models company value as endogenously dependent on managers’ eﬀort. Managers will
exert more eﬀort if they own a higher share of the equity, because they will receive a higher
share of the resulting proﬁts (see, for example, Berhold (1971) and Jensen and Meckling
(1976) for early contributions). Both the signalling view and the agency view result in an
ineﬃcient allocation of risk. Owners are exposed to more idiosyncratic risk than would be
optimal under symmetric information.
The theoretically derived advantages of concentrated ownership are especially relevant for
private companies, since their operations are typically opaque, which leads to high costs of
information acquisition for external providers of ﬁnance.1 There is also evidence that con-
centrated ownership exposes the owners to substantial levels of idiosyncratic risk. Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) document that, on average, owners of private companies have
invested 41% of their net worth in private equity, 82% of which is invested in just one actively
managed company.2
The cost due to lack of diversiﬁcation has been described in the literature for diﬀerent
situations. Tobin (1958) ﬁnds in his early contribution that risk-averse investors divide their
investment in monetary assets between interest-earning but risky assets and non-interest
earning but safe cash, in such a way as to achieve their preferred risk-return trade-oﬀ. Also
for investors, Brennan and Torous (1999) investigate investments in the stock market and
ﬁnd that signiﬁcant welfare gains can be attained by increasing the number of securities in the
portfolio. Managers of public companies are often deliberately exposed to the idiosyncratic
4risk of their companies through stock or stock options in order to provide them with incentives
to exert eﬀort. Managers value stock or stock options in their compensation contracts less,
when greater parts of their wealth are already correlated with the value of the company
(Lambert et al. (1991), Meulbroek (2001), Hall and Murphy (2002) and Kahl et al. (2003)).3
The speciﬁc situation of owners of companies has also been addressed. Kerins et al.
(2004) show that lack of owners’ diversiﬁcation increases the cost of equity capital. The
authors use the capital asset pricing model and data on newly public companies to derive
the cost of capital for an entrepreneur with concentrated ownership. Their simulations show
that exposure to idiosyncratic risk has a large inﬂuence on the cost of equity capital of
private companies. The authors calculate the returns achievable in the stock market with a
portfolio that has the same total risk as an investment divided between a private company
and the stock market. Underlying the calculation is the presumption that rational owners
will demand compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. The model predicts
an increase of 14.2 percentage points in the opportunity cost of equity capital for a small
company, if the share of net worth invested in the company changes from 15% to 25%. This
is a substantial risk premium considering that annual returns on public equity, as calculated
by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), were 11.0%, 14.6% and 24.7% for the periods
1990–92, 1993–95 and 1996–98 respectively. The returns on public equity can be used as a
benchmark for the cost of equity capital if investors can diversify, since the returns do not
include a compensation for exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
Given the costs of concentrated ownership, owners have an incentive to limit their exposure
to idiosyncratic risk by using external ﬁnancing. The pecking order theory (Myers and
Majluf (1984)) predicts that companies prefer to ﬁnance with retained earnings (internal
equity), riskless debt and new equity in decreasing order, because the costs of asymmetric
5information are smallest for retained earnings and largest for new equity.4 The relatively
low average level of leverage of 33% in the sample suggests that most companies have not
used up their debt capacity. The pecking order theory predicts that these companies will
consider debt instead of equity when raising external ﬁnance.5 In addition to the argument
made by the pecking order theory, owners may be reluctant to issue new equity since they
lose part of their control, if new owners join the company. It can also be diﬃcult to ﬁnd
a person who ﬁts into the existing team. Furthermore, the advantages of large ownership
shares expounded by Leland and Pyle (1977) and agency theory are reduced, if external
equity is raised. Bankruptcy costs can increase the cost of bank ﬁnance for higher levels of
leverage. If owners equalize the marginal costs of internal equity and debt ﬁnance, they will
have a higher demand for bank loans for higher exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
In summary, we expect that, for most companies, the inﬂuence of idiosyncratic risk on the
cost of equity capital inﬂuences the demand for bank loans but not the demand for external
equity. A lack of diversiﬁcation makes bank loans more attractive for them. We derive the
ﬁrst hypothesis accordingly:
Hypothesis 1: Owners with a higher exposure to idiosyncratic risk have a higher demand
for bank loans.
Since a higher demand for loans is not necessarily matched by a higher supply of loans, it
is worthwhile to consider leverage – as the result of repeated demand and supply decisions
– as well. From the increased cost of equity capital we would expect lack of diversiﬁcation
to have a sizable positive eﬀect on leverage.
Hypothesis 2: Owners with a higher exposure to idiosyncratic risk choose higher leverage.
6An alternative hypothesis can also be put forward. One can argue that owners with a
higher exposure to idiosyncratic risk will have less incentive to borrow, since they wish to
avoid ﬁnancial risk. There is evidence for this behaviour for large companies. CEOs whose
wealth is more sensitive to the stock price of the company choose lower leverage (Coles et al.
(2006)). Chava and Purnanandam (forthcoming) ﬁnd that CFOs but not CEOs who are
more exposed to company risk reduce the share of ﬂoating rate debt in the ﬂoating-to-ﬁxed
rate debt structure. It is possible that owners of small companies try to reduce the level
of risk by restricting their use of bank ﬁnance. A negative relationship between exposure
to idiosyncratic risk and leverage is therefore also possible. However, we expect that for
most private companies the beneﬁts of the availability of additional bank ﬁnance (e.g. the
opportunity to grow the company) will outweigh the cost of higher ﬁnancial risk.
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) ﬁnd that, on average, returns to private equity
are not higher than returns to public equity. This is a puzzle, since there does not seem to be
a compensation for idiosyncratic risk. This puzzle concerns the level of returns. For owners
who are also managers a possible explanation for low average returns could be additional
nonpecuniary beneﬁts, such as utility from being one’s own boss. It is also possible that
owners are overoptimistic with respect to the future success of their companies. In this paper
we are not concerned with levels, but look at variation in exposure to idiosyncratic risk and
in the ﬁnancing of companies. We do not think that non-pecuniary beneﬁts or overoptimism
explain the variation in ﬁnancing addressed in this analysis.6
73 Data
3.1 Data Source
The Survey of Small Business Finances 1998 (SSBF), which is conducted by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC, is used for the empirical analysis.
The survey provides information on private companies with up to 500 employees from non-
agricultural and non-ﬁnancial sectors in the United States. The survey provides information
on basic ﬁrm and owner characteristics, sources of ﬁnancial services, experience with the
most recent loan application, information on the private wealth and credit history of the
largest owner, balance sheet information as well as income and expenses information. This
survey is well suited for our study because it provides information on the ﬁnancial situation of
private companies and on the personal wealth of their owners. The investigation is restricted
to the wave from 1998, since previous waves do not include information on personal wealth.7
Only companies with positive equity values are included in the analysis, because it is
otherwise not possible to derive the share of the owner’s net worth that is invested.8 In
addition, companies are required to have positive assets and owners are required to have
positive private wealth. 2,617 companies are eventually included in the analysis.
3.2 Variables
The main concern of this paper is the inﬂuence of poor diversiﬁcation on the ﬁnancial
structure of private companies. We measure lack of diversiﬁcation as the ratio of the largest
owner’s equity investment to the net worth of the largest owner, i.e., as share of net worth
invested (SNWI). Net worth is deﬁned as the book value of the equity investment plus the
equity value of the primary residence plus the sum of all assets minus the sum of all other
8liabilities. 90% of the companies in the SSBF are managed by an owner and not by a hired
employee. For the owner-managed companies it is likely that the largest owner takes part in
the management. The level of diversiﬁcation of the largest owner’s investments will therefore
be important for ﬁnancial decisions.
Two measures of diversiﬁcation are calculated. The ﬁrst measure, denoted by SNWI A,
considers only the value of the equity investment.
SNWI A =
(ownership share ∗ book value of equity)
net worth
The second measure, SNWI B, takes into account that the equity investment may not
be the only way in which the owner’s assets are tied to the company. Owners can also give
personal guarantees for company loans, they can use private assets as collateral and they
can extend loans to the company. The survey includes information on the extent of these
activities for all of the owners combined. This information is therefore multiplied by the
ownership share of the largest owner to obtain an approximation of that owner’s personal
involvement.
SNWI B =
ownership share ∗ (book value of equity + guarantees + collateral + loans)
net worth
Share of net worth invested is an approximation of the risk exposure of owners due to
their equity investment in a private company. Owners are exposed to several types of risk.
For example, there is a concentration of income from one source and the possibility that the
value of the ownership share could fall. These risks certainly increase with SNWI. In order to
9completely describe the risk exposure of owners, it would be desirable to have information on
the correlation structure of the returns of the assets in the owners’ portfolios. For instance, if
the returns to private equity have a negative correlation with the stock market, the total risk
of the portfolio is lower compared to a positive correlation, if the owner has an investment in
both. The surveys do, however, not contain information from which the correlation structure
could be derived.
It can be argued that SNWI underestimates the risk exposure of the owner. The measure
is based on the book value of equity, because the survey does not provide the market value.
This reduces the variation in SNWI, since underestimation is more pronounced for successful
companies. However, there is still a large cross-sectional variation in SNWI. The book value
is also more similar to the original investment of the owner, which may be of relevance for
the owner’s perception of risk.
The data set under analysis also includes companies whose owners have unlimited liability,
i.e. they are liable for company obligations with all their private assets. The question arises
whether our measure of lack of diversiﬁcation is meaningful in this situation. The bankruptcy
law in the USA stipulates that private assets below exemption limits can be kept by owners
in a bankruptcy proceeding. In practise, owners often have no assets exceeding these limits
and therefore only lose their equity investment in a bankruptcy (Berkowitz and White (2004,
p. 71) and Fan and White (2003, p. 544)). It follows that SNWI is a valid proxy for risk
exposure for owners with unlimited liability as well.9
As a ﬁrst dependent variable we use the demand for new loans. The variable loan
application is equal to 1 if an application for a new loan was ﬁled in the three years
preceding the survey and 0 otherwise. Hypothesis 1 relates to the demand of bank loans in
general; it is independent of whether loans are new or renewals. We use data on new loans,
10since the SSBF does not include information on loan renewals. Most companies applied for a
new loan at a commercial bank (71%). Finance companies were used by 11%, savings banks
and credit unions by 7%. 11% used other sources.
Leverage is the second dependent variable. It is deﬁned as the sum of a company’s
total liabilities divided by its total assets (sum of equity and liabilities). Total liabilities are
the sum of long-term liabilities, such as loans, mortgages, notes or bonds, and short-term
liabilities due within one year, such as accounts payable, accrued expenses, taxes payable,
prepayments, deposits and advances from customers. Leverage includes loans that are made
by owners to their companies and the outstanding amount on company credit cards. The
use of personal credit cards for company expenses is not included.10
The regressions include controls for many company and owner characteristics. We control
for company size, measured by number of employees, and company age, deﬁned as the
number of years since the company was founded or acquired. Ownership share is deﬁned
as the share of equity owned by the largest owner. Dummies for legal form diﬀerentiate
between sole proprietorships, partnerships, S- and C-corporations.11 All regressions include
industry dummies deﬁned at the two-digit SIC level. Regional dummies diﬀerentiate
between nine regions. A further dummy diﬀerentiates between urban and rural location.
The education level of the largest owner is captured by dummies for high school graduate
and college/postgraduate degree, with no high school degree being the base category. The
entrepreneurial work experience is measured as number of years owning or managing a
company. Dummies for the ethnicity of the owner cover Hispanic, Asian and African-
American ownership with White as base category.
We also include control variables to capture the ﬁnancial standing of the company. First,
the credit rating by Dun and Bradstreet classiﬁes companies in ﬁve categories. The rating
11reﬂects the likelihood of payment delinquency during the next 12 months. Second, we use
dummies for the credit history of the company and the owner. They cover whether
the ﬁrm or its principal owner declared bankruptcy within the past seven years, whether
the owner has been delinquent on personal obligations for 60 or more days within the past
three years, whether the ﬁrm has been delinquent on business obligations for 60 or more
days within the past three years, and whether any judgements have been rendered against
the principal owner within the past three years. The variable length gives the length of the
relationship with the company’s main ﬁnancial institution in months.12
3.3 Summary Statistics
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables can be found in Table 1. The measures SNWI A
and SNWI B document a considerable lack of diversiﬁcation. SNWI A has an average of
25.3%. By additionally considering guarantees, collateral and loans, the average value of
SNWI B increases by six percentage points.
The SSBF data cover small to medium-sized companies. The average number of employees
is 28.3 with a substantially lower median value of 5. 26.3% of the companies applied for a
new loan in the three years preceding the survey. It can be seen that not all companies have
investment opportunities that would require additional loans.13 The average level of leverage
stands at 33.3%. As is typical for private companies, the ownership structure is concentrated
with an average ownership share of the largest owner of 79.6%. Even the median company
has only one owner. As Table 2 shows, the industry spectrum of the survey covers almost
the whole US economy.
Table 3 shows the share of companies with demand for new loans in the last three years
12according to three categories of SNWI A. Companies with higher values of SNWI A are more
likely to demand new loans. The median of leverage is also increasing in SNWI A.14
The SSBF data has a two-stage stratiﬁed random sample design. The sample is stratiﬁed
according to size, region and urban versus rural area. In addition, companies with Hispanic,
Asian and African-American majority ownership and large companies are oversampled. We
use unweighted regressions with controls for the variables used for stratiﬁcation and over-
sampling. This approach was also chosen by Bitler et al. (2005).
[Table 1], [Table 2], [Table 3]
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Endogeneity of Regressors
In the empirical analysis we need to be concerned with potential endogeneity of our main
variable of interest, share of net worth invested (SNWI). First of all, there is the problem of
reverse causality. If owners demand loans (and get the application granted), they have access
to ﬁnancial resources that allow them to limit their equity investment. Hence, demand for
loans may have a negative inﬂuence on SNWI. Reverse causality also introduces a negative
relationship between leverage and SNWI, since the accumulated use of bank loans allows a
reduction in equity ﬁnance. The negative inﬂuence of the reverse causality eﬀect on SNWI
makes it more diﬃcult to ﬁnd evidence in favour of our hypotheses.
Second, we need to be wary of measurement error in company and owner related variables.
Most of the small companies included in the SSBF are not required by law to draw up a
balance sheet. Therefore, the measurement of leverage may be imprecise. Information on
the net worth of the principal owner is provided in three categories: the value of the equity
13investment, the value of home equity and the value of other nonﬁrm assets. There could also
be measurement error in the wealth information.15
Third, omitted variables may bias the coeﬃcient of SNWI. Controls for company risk are
important, since risk can inﬂuence both the owner’s invested share of personal wealth and
leverage. Bitler et al. (2005) ﬁnd a negative correlation between ﬁrm risk and ownership
share.16 Owners are only willing to take on a high ownership share if they consider the risk
to be manageable. In an extreme case, this could result in a negative correlation between
SNWI and exposure to risk. Risk is also an important factor for the bank’s decision whether
to extend a loan. Companies with higher risk will ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to obtain loans, i.e.
they will have lower leverage. The inﬂuence of risk could then lead to a spurious positive
correlation between leverage and SNWI. We control for risk with the credit rating of the
company and with the credit history of both company and owner. Other company charac-
teristics included, such as size, age and industry, also help to control for risk. Nevertheless,
the controls may not capture company risk perfectly.
Fourth, the regression concerning demand for bank loans has a potential endogeneity
problem in that the left hand side variable is measured before the right hand side variables.
The information for the incidence of loan applications, spans the time period of the three
years preceding the survey, i.e. of 1996–1998, whereas lack of diversiﬁcation and the other
regressors are measured at the end of ﬁscal year 1998.17
To deal with the above-mentioned problems of endogeneity we use the instrumental vari-
ables approach. We run a ﬁrst-stage regression with speciﬁc owner characteristics as instru-
ments to predict instrumented values of the endogenous regressor SNWI. In the second-stage
or main regression we use the predicted value of the endogenous variable as regressor to ob-
tain a consistent parameter estimate. Both the ﬁrst- and the second stage regressions contain
14the same set of additional control variables for owner and company characteristics.
The ﬁrst instrument is age of the largest owner measured in years. Owner age should be
related to SNWI, as Heaton and Lucas (2000) document that the portfolio composition of
individuals is inﬂuenced by their age. Individuals above the age of 65 have a smaller share
invested in private equity. Furthermore, net worth may increase with age, since individuals
have had more time to save. For age to be a valid instrument, it is important that we
control for other variables in the second stage regression. First, we control for the education
level and the experience of the owner, since they are related to age and it is to be expected
that better educated and more experienced owners will ﬁnd it easier to obtain bank loans.
By using education and experience as explicit controls, we use only the part of SNWI that
can be explained by age, net of experience and education. Second, we control for company
age. Within 10 years, 80% of companies exit the market (Dunne et al. (1988)). It is
therefore possible that older owners run more successful companies. Owners of successful
companies may have more outside wealth and therefore lower SNWI. Also, according to
the pecking order theory, it can be expected that successful companies ﬁnance more with
retained earnings and less with bank loans. Survivorship bias may therefore lead to a positive
spurious relationship between SNWI and demand for bank ﬁnancing through the instrument
owner age, if we do not control for the age of the company.
A further instrument is the sex of the owner. The dummy ‘female owner’ takes the value 1
for female owners and the value 0 for male owners. It has to be acknowledged that there may
be diﬀerences in demand for bank loans or capital structure in a univariate analysis of male
and female owned companies resulting from company characteristics that diﬀer between male
and female owners. For example, the SSBF data show that the companies of male owners
are on average larger than the companies of female owners. However, there is no reason to
15expect that male and female owners diﬀer in their ﬁnancing strategies after detailed company
and owner characteristics are controlled for. We therefore include variables capturing, among
other things, company size and industry as well as education, experience and credit history of
the owner. For example, Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) ﬁnd that after controlling for owner
wealth and other owner and company characteristics there are no diﬀerences between loan
turndowns for male and female owners. In addition, Wilson et al. (2007) ﬁnd no evidence of
systematic diﬀerences in the perceptions held by bank oﬃcers of male and female business
owners.
Table 4 shows the ﬁrst-stage regression results. From columns (1) and (2) it can be seen
that owner age has a signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence on SNWI. Older owners have had more
time to build up wealth outside the company by saving their income. This income can be
either from owning a company or wage income from employment. The dummy for female
owners shows that women invest a smaller share of their personal wealth in one company.
A possible explanation for the higher investment shares among men would be if owning or
managing a company has a higher importance for them. This could be the case, if they are
under more pressure to earn a living. For example, our calculations with data from the 2001
Survey of Consumer Finances show that male entrepreneurs work more hours per week than
female entrepreneurs.18
The results of instrumental variables regressions can be biased if the instruments are weak,
i.e. if the instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. We apply
the quantitative deﬁnition of weak instruments given by Stock and Yogo (2005) and are able
to reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. The critical value of the test for a desired
maximum size of 10% for a 5% Wald test is 19.93. Our test statistic is 25.72 and therefore
surpasses the critical value.19
16[Table 4]
4.2 Demand for Bank Loans
Table 5 presents probit regressions on demand for bank loans. The speciﬁcation without
instruments in column (1) shows a higher demand for bank loans for owners with higher
values of SNWI, but the result is aﬀected by reverse causality. If owners decide, for whatever
reason, not to use bank loans as a means of ﬁnancing their company, they must rely more
heavily on their own resources; this increases SNWI. The results also show that larger and
younger companies exhibit a higher demand for new loans. In order to identify the inﬂuence
of SNWI, the regressions include additional control variables whose coeﬃcients are not shown
for brevity.
In the regressions in columns (2) to (6) we instrument SNWI to control for reverse causal-
ity. The basic speciﬁcation in column (2) supports Hypothesis 1; SNWI increases the prob-
ability of loan applications. Owners who are less diversiﬁed approach banks more often in
order to obtain additional funds. Bank ﬁnance is more attractive for them, because they
have a higher cost of equity capital. Speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation increase in SNWI
A leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase of 30.2 percentage points in the probability of mak-
ing a loan application. The inﬂuence of poor diversiﬁcation is therefore quite substantial,
especially considering that the probability of applying for a new loan is only 26.3%. The IV
estimate is considerably larger than the OLS estimate, although an upward bias from reverse
causality is expected for OLS. We therefore conclude that the OLS estimate was aﬀected by
a bias towards zero from measurement error.
The remaining speciﬁcations are intended as a robustness check. In column (3) we ad-
17ditionally control for the ownership share of the largest owner. The coeﬃcient of this vari-
able is positive at the 10% signiﬁcance level. Owners who choose a high ownership share
to have control over their companies may need more bank ﬁnancing for their investment
opportunities.20 In column (4) we employ our second measure of diversiﬁcation, SNWI B.
Here the results suggest as well that lack of diversiﬁcation increases demand for bank loans.
Next, we investigate whether results change, if only companies with limited liability (S-
and C-corporations) are included in the regressions. As already mentioned, owners are, in
practice, unlikely to lose more money than they have invested, even with unlimited liability.
However, it is still of interest to report results for companies with limited liability separately,
since there may be diﬀerences in the way owners perceive risk. When we restrict our analysis
to companies with limited liability, we still ﬁnd that lack of diversiﬁcation increases loan
demand (column 5).
In companies with more than one owner, the exposure to idiosyncratic risk and therefore
the cost of equity to the owner can diﬀer between owners. In order to remove the inﬂuence
of other owners, we investigate our hypotheses separately for companies with just one owner.
However, we think that the focus on the largest owner makes sense in most cases, since the
largest owner will be the least diversiﬁed, if the external wealth of the owners is the same.
It is therefore likely that we captured the owner with the highest exposure to idiosyncratic
risk in the previous regressions. The results for companies with just one owner are shown in
column (6). As before, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of lack of diversiﬁcation on the demand
for loans.
As an additional robustness check we investigate the inﬂuence of SNWI on the desired
loan volume (results not reported). We use Tobit regressions since all companies without
loan applications have a loan demand of zero. We ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
18inﬂuence of SNWI A on the desired loan volume without using instruments (coeﬃcient [beta]
0.94, standard error 0.18) and using instruments (coeﬃcient [beta] 5.91, standard error 1.64).
Overall, there is robust evidence for the hypothesis that a higher exposure to idiosyncratic
risk leads to a higher demand for bank ﬁnancing.
[Table 5]
4.3 Inﬂuence on Leverage
Table 6 displays the eﬀect of poor diversiﬁcation on leverage. In column (1) we present the
results of the OLS speciﬁcation. The negative sign of SNWI is due to non-standard measure-
ment error. The measurement error is non-standard, since the error in measuring liabilities
is included in both the dependent variable leverage and in the regressor SNWI. Liabilities
constitute the numerator of the dependent variable. SNWI has equity times ownership share
in its numerator with equity calculated as the diﬀerence between total assets and liabilities.
If there is measurement error in liabilities, this will introduce a negative relationship between
leverage and SNWI. In order to control both for measurement error and for reverse causality,
we use an instrumental variables approach in the remaining speciﬁcations.
In column (2) we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of SNWI. A more severe lack
of diversiﬁcation therefore leads to higher leverage, after controlling for endogeneity. The
inﬂuence of poor diversiﬁcation on the equilibrium value of leverage is quite large. A one
standard deviation increase in SNWI A leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase in leverage of 18.0
percentage points. This is indeed substantial, especially when considering that the average
value of leverage in the sample is 33.3%. The empirical evidence clearly conﬁrms Hypothesis
2: less diversiﬁed owners choose higher leverage for their companies. The additional controls
19show an insigniﬁcant inﬂuence of size on leverage and a signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence of
age. As companies grow older they often use accumulated proﬁts to pay down debt and to
increase their equity base.
In addition to the regressors already employed in the demand equation, we control for the
length of the relationship with the company’s main ﬁnancial institution, since it was shown
that an established banking relationship can inﬂuence the quantity and the price of available
credit (see, for example, Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Cole (1998)
and Harhoﬀ and K¨ orting (1998)).21 Without a relationship control, the instrument owner
age may be directly related to leverage, since this instrument can be correlated with the
length of the banking relationship. The length of the relationship with the main ﬁnancial
institution has a quadratic inﬂuence on leverage with a maximum at about 11 years. Since
we have more instruments than endogenous variables, we can test the statistical validity of
the instruments with overidentifying restrictions. As reported in Table 6, the instruments
pass this test for all speciﬁcations.22
In the next two columns we show robustness checks with all observations. In column (3)
we additionally control for the ownership share of the largest owner. Ownership share has no
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on leverage, but the inﬂuence of SNWI remains unchanged. In column
(4) we use SNWI B as an alternative measure for the level of diversiﬁcation. Again, we ﬁnd
higher leverage for owners with a higher exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
As in the previous subsection, we also investigate the robustness of the results with
subsamples of companies with limited liability and of companies with only one owner. The
regressions in columns (5) and (6) show that the results remain unchanged by the restrictions
on the included companies.
We also investigate the inﬂuence of SNWI on diﬀerent measures of leverage (results not
20reported). We use net leverage (total debt net of cash divided by total assets) and ﬁnd
a coeﬃcient of SNWI A of 1.40 with a standard error of 0.32. We also ﬁnd a positive
and signiﬁcant inﬂuence of SNWI A on leverage when we separate leverage into long-term
(coeﬃcient 0.32, standard error 0.16) and short-term (coeﬃcient 0.44, standard error 0.13).
Long-term leverage includes liabilities with a maturity of more than one year.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that trade credit (accounts payable) are an important
source of funding for private companies. In our sample trade credit makes up 8.5% of total
assets and is therefore a substantial part of total leverage. We ﬁnd that SNWI A has a
positive inﬂuence on the use of trade credit (coeﬃcient 0.37, standard error 0.10). Thus
SNWI has not only an inﬂuence on bank loans, but also on the use of other forms of debt.
The instruments pass the test for overidentifying restrictions also for the speciﬁcations with
alternative measures of leverage.
[Table 6]
Strebulaev (forthcoming) cautions that in the presence of adjustment costs, cross-sectional
relationships between leverage and other variables determined by empirical analysis may
diﬀer from the relationships expected if variables are at their target level. The argument
is illustrated with the help of the trade-oﬀ theory, which postulates a positive relationship
between leverage and proﬁtability since interest paid can be deducted from proﬁts for the
calculation of taxes. Even if the trade-oﬀ theory is valid, a negative relationship between
leverage and proﬁtability may still be observed, if proﬁts are used to pay down loans and
leverage is adjusted infrequently. In our case, both leverage and SNWI are likely aﬀected by
adjustment costs. Higher proﬁts will lead to lower leverage and, to a small degree, to lower
values of SNWI, if proﬁts are partially used to reduce debts and partially paid out to the
owners. This could introduce a positive relationship between the variables. However, this
21inﬂuence of proﬁtability is removed from our analysis through the use of instruments which
are unrelated to proﬁtability.
Overall, our empirical analysis shows that lack of diversiﬁcation leads to higher lever-
age. The empirical results have important implications for our understanding of the capital
structure of private companies. We ﬁnd that entrepreneurs who are more exposed to the
idiosyncratic risk of their companies use bank ﬁnancing more extensively. Bank ﬁnancing
allows them to grow their companies without increasing their risk exposure further through
additional equity investment. Alternatively, entrepreneurs can use bank ﬁnancing to reduce
their own investment. Since exposure to idiosyncratic risk increases the cost of equity capi-
tal and, accordingly, the required returns of an investment project, this also means that the
availability of bank loans makes the realization of some investment projects proﬁtable that
would not have been carried out if no such loans were available.
5 Conclusion
The ﬁnancing of private companies relies to a large extent on the personal resources of their
owners. Equity investments often amount to a substantial share of owners’ total net worth,
which exposes them to the idiosyncratic risk of their companies. Since this risk exposure
increases the cost of equity capital substantially, it should have an important inﬂuence on
the capital structure of private companies. If owners try to equalize the marginal costs of
equity and debt ﬁnancing, companies led by owners who have a higher share of net worth
invested should have a higher demand for bank loans and should display higher values for
leverage. These are the core hypotheses tested in this paper.
Using survey data of private companies in the US, we ﬁnd that lack of diversiﬁcation
22increases demand for loans, measured as the probability of making a loan application, as well
as leverage. This paper identiﬁes owners’ risk exposure as a statistically and economically
important inﬂuence on the capital structure of private companies.
In future research it would be of interest to test whether the eﬀect of exposure to id-
iosyncratic risk on leverage found for private companies also exists for public companies.
On theoretical grounds, we would also expect an eﬀect for public companies with a concen-
trated ownership structure. It may be possible to use public companies in which families or
founders hold high ownership shares for a corresponding test.
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28Notes
1We do observe concentrated ownership in our sample of private companies. The compa-
nies in the Survey of Small Business Finances 1998 have an average ownership share of the
largest owner of 79.6% and a median value of 100%.
2Although the holding of large ownership shares leads to a lack of diversiﬁcation at the
individual level, the correlation between share of net worth invested and ownership share in
the data is -0.01 and statistically not diﬀerent from zero. Diﬀerences in company size and
net worth are more important in explaining the share of net worth invested than ownership
share.
3 Heaney and Holmen (2002) use data on the exposure to idiosyncratic risk for Swedish
shareholders of listed companies to approximate the value they attach to control using the
model developed by Lambert et al. (1991).
4We empirically capture retained earnings in the book value of equity. The book value of
equity is deﬁned as the original investment of the owners plus the retained earnings of past
years. The cost of capital for original investment and retained earnings are the same, since
both are part of the owners’ wealth that is invested in the company.
5This prediction of the pecking order theory is reﬂected in the data. Companies in the
legal form of a corporation were asked whether they obtained additional equity from new
owners in the year 1998. Only 1% of the corporations did. For comparison, 31% of the
corporations applied for a new loan in the three years preceding the survey. (There is no
information covering an identical time period.)
6M¨ uller (2004) ﬁnds that owners with a higher exposure to idiosyncratic risk do obtain
29higher returns to their equity investment. The paper does not explain the low average returns
to private equity.
7Detailed information on the 1998 SSBF survey is available in Bitler et al. (2001).
821% of the companies have negative or zero equity values. This is a common ﬁnding for
small and medium-sized enterprises. For example, KfW Research (2006) ﬁnds that almost
20% of German SMEs have negative equity values.
9If a private company goes bankrupt in the USA with obligations still outstanding, an
owner with unlimited liability can declare personal bankruptcy in order to dispose of the
company debt. It is possible to give up all assets that are not exempt, but to keep future
earnings (chapter 7) or to keep all assets and agree to a repayment plan to repay part of the
debts (chapter 13). The exemption rules diﬀer between states. The median value for home
equity is USD 15,000 and the median value for other personal assets is USD 7,000 (Berkowitz
and White (2004)). If owners agree to keep up payments on loans that are secured on their
home or private car, they do not lose these assets. Furthermore, if the retirement savings
are not excluded from the bankruptcy proceeding in the ﬁrst place, they can be kept if the
amount is reasonably necessary to support oneself upon retirement (Jackson (2001)).
10Our deﬁnition of leverage follows accounting rules by using information shown in balance
sheets. Average leverage increases by 2 percentage points if personal credit cards are included
in the deﬁnition. Average leverage decreases by 3 percentage points if loans from owners are
excluded. We obtain identical regression results for both modiﬁcations.
11C- and S-corporations are both characterized by limited liability. C-corporations have
to pay corporation tax on proﬁts that are paid out to shareholders, whereas the proﬁts of
30S-corporations are only charged with the personal income tax rate of their owners.
121% of the highest values are replaced with the value of the 99th percentile (480 months)
in order to reduce the inﬂuence of extreme values.
136.2% of the companies obtained additional equity capital from new or existing owners in
the year 1998. Overall, 29.8% of the companies applied for new loans or obtained additional
equity.
14We report a tabulation of the median since the results for average leverage would be
inﬂuenced by measurement error.
15Browning et al. (2003) consider problems that may arise when questions about aggregate
values are asked in surveys. They discuss the usefulness of total expenditure questions as
opposed to asking for expenditure in diﬀerent categories. First, rounding can happen, i.e.
values may be noisy. However, even with rounding, the total expenditure questions still
contain valuable information. Second, it is possible that total expenditure is underestimated,
if only one question about the total is asked.
16Bitler et al. (2005) measure ﬁrm risk as the absolute value of the residual of a regression
of the proﬁt-to-equity ratio on ﬁrm characteristics.
17Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) face the same situation in their analysis of loan turndowns
and discrimination also conducted with the SSBF data.
18Bitler et al. (2005) use similar instruments for ownership for data from the Survey of
Consumer Finances, namely age, age squared and dummies for type of company acquisition.
19We obtain identical results for the main speciﬁcations if we use the instruments indi-
31vidually. However, a test for redundancy shows that using both instruments improves the
asymptotic eﬃciency of the estimation (See Hall and Peixe (2003) for a discussion of this
test.).
20We instrument ownership share, since it may be aﬀected by reverse causality. If bank
ﬁnancing is not available and a ﬁrm’s original owner has too few resources to meet the
total investment required, it may be necessary to take on an additional owner. For the
speciﬁcations with ownership share in Table 5 and Table 6 we additionally use dummies
for the type of the company acquisition – the basis category is founded with dummies for
purchased and inherited respectively – as instruments, since the informational content of our
two standard instruments is not suﬃcient here.
21We do not use this regressor in the demand equation. For companies who applied for a
loan we could use the length of the relationship with the institution where they applied; for
companies who did not apply for a loan, however, there is no meaningful equivalent.
22We also tried a speciﬁcation with additional controls for company proﬁtability (ROA)
and a proxy for the company’s tangible assets. According to the trade-oﬀ theory both
variables can inﬂuence leverage. We ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant inﬂuence of ROA on
leverage. Since it can be argued that proﬁtability is an endogenous variable, we do not keep
it in the main speciﬁcation. Tangible assets are not reported separately in the SSBF. We
calculate the share of the book value of land plus depreciable assets (including intangible
assets) to total assets as a proxy. This variable has a positive but insigniﬁcant inﬂuence on
leverage. The results for SNWI do not change with the inclusion of these variables.
32Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Company characteristics
Number of employees 28.3 5 58.1 1 482
Company age (in years) 15.3 12 12.4 1 104
Dummy loan application 0.263 0 0.440 0 1
Leverage (in %) 33.3 27.3 31.0 0 99.8
Length banking relationship (in months) 99.8 60 97.4 1 480
Owner characteristics
Net worth (in million US-$) 1.538 0.448 4.412 0.001 116
SNWI A (in %) 25.3 17.9 24.1 0.004 98.9
SNWI B (in %) 31.3 22.3 29.0 0.014 100
Ownership share (in %) 79.6 100 27.8 1 100
Owner age (in years) 51.2 51 11.3 21 95
Dummy female owner 0.206 0 0.404 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reﬂect the variation in the sample, but are not representative of the US economy.
33Table 2: Industry Distribution
Industry No. of companies % of companies
SIC 1 – Mining, construction 262 10.0
SIC 2 – Manufacturing 125 4.8
SIC 3 – Manufacturing 177 6.8
SIC 4 – Transp., communication, utilities 97 3.7
SIC 5 – Retail trade 731 27.9
SIC 6 – Real estate 152 5.8
SIC 7 – Services 592 22.6
SIC 8 – Services 481 18.4
Total 2617 100
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reﬂect the variation in the sample, but are not representative of the US economy. Industry dummies at the
2-digit level are included in the regression analysis.
34Table 3: Tabulation of Financing Decisions With Respect to SNWI A
Category Share of companies Median of Leverage No. of
of SNWI A with loan demand (in %) companies
Lowest third 0.187 22.5 863
Middle third 0.275 28.1 864
Highest third 0.325 28.7 890
All categories 0.263 27.3 2617
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics
reﬂect the variation in the sample, but are not representative of the US economy. The lowest third includes
values of SNWI A between 0 and 8.4%, the middle third between 8.4% and 30.1%, and the highest third
includes values of SNWI A larger than 30.1%.
35Table 4: First-Stage Regression Results
Dep. variable: SNWI A SNWI B
(1) (2)
Owner age -0.341*** -0.406***
(0.055) (0.064)
Dummy female owner -3.679*** -4.238***
(1.174) (1.352)
Company size 0.104*** 0.133***
(0.011) (0.013)
Company age 0.016 -0.070
(0.046) (0.053)
Number of observations 2617 2617
Joint signiﬁcance of
excluded instruments, F(2, 2545) 24.40*** 25.18***
Shea’s partial R squared 0.019 0.020
R squared 0.179 0.228
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions also include dummies for industry at the 2-digit level as
well as dummies for legal form, region, urban/rural area and credit history. Controls for the credit rating of
the company, experience, education and ethnicity of the owner are also included.
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